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ABSTRACT
UK health law has recently become more attentive to corporeality and
embodiment, with implications for how legal subjectivity is understood. Yet,
the body of health law remains a distinctively human body. Non-human
bodies ﬁgure only at its margins, in its response to technologies such as
xenotransplantation which expose the fault-lines surrounding human bodies. I
aim to further trouble this boundary by exploring the liminal, queer and
posthuman ﬁgure of the ‘trans-embryo’. I argue that these extracorporeal
embryos carry signiﬁcant potential to disrupt our understandings of the
human and of the legal subject. Eschewing personhood arguments, I aim to
recast trans-embryos as embodied and relational products of human and
animal reproductive labour. I conclude that, so viewed, they facilitate a new
understanding of the corporeality and vulnerability we share with animals,
thereby challenging human exceptionalism and the perceived distinctiveness
of human bodies. Consequently, new forms of legal subjectivity which reﬂect
an inter-species ethics are required.
KEYWORDS Trans-embryos; human admixed embryos; human/non-human boundary; the human body;
corporeality; vulnerability; legal subjectivity
1. Introduction
In a recent examination of stem cell research, Charis Thompson has noted
that:
The boundary between human and non-human has long been contested,
protected and crossed in biomedicine and in its political and cultural
representations.1
In this article I seek to interrogate this human/non-human boundary in order
to question the legal and cultural distinctiveness that attaches to the human
body. My enquiry is therefore located at the borders of the human and is
mindful of Jennifer Nedelsky’s warning about the pervasive and destructive
role of boundary metaphors in law. As she suggests, ‘in law the concept of
boundary has become more of a mask than a lens’.2 Nedelsky’s work does
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not explicitly address the question of animals, but I suggest that the human/
animal boundary is an especially pernicious legal border. It operates to mask
the harmful consequences for the bodies of those deemed to fall outside the
parameters of the human and shores up an anthropocentric worldview in
which the human is deemed the measure of all things. On this understanding,
non-human bodies are readily conceptualised as consumable parts or mere
research material,3 rather than embodied entities which share relevant charac-
teristics – including their corporeality and vulnerability – with humans.
I begin by considering the historically glaring neglect of corporeality in
health law and how in recent years the discipline has demonstrated a greater
openness to addressing bodily concerns at the prompting of feminists and
other advocates of marginalised bodies. Nevertheless, it is striking that the
cast of bodies now considered within the domain of health law remains exclu-
sively human. Consequently, I suggest that if we grant that there is something
valuable about corporeality and bodies such that they deserve legal protection
from the intervention of others,4 we need to address the further question of
whether there is anything special about human bodies speciﬁcally, such that
they alone deserve special ethical consideration or legal protection. In thinking
through this question, I take as my focus what I argue to be the liminal, queer
and posthuman ﬁgure of the trans-embryo. Building on the insights of Donna
Haraway and Sarah Franklin, I use the label ‘trans’ in this article to signal the
queer status of trans-embryos in the sense referred to by Phillip Bernhardt
House. He argues that the appellation ‘queer’ applies to ‘anything which actively
disrupts normativity, transgresses the boundaries of propriety, and interferes
with the status quo in closed social and sexual systems’.5
I suggest that designating inter-species embryos as unruly, liminal and
trans reveals much more about these entities than dismissing them as mere
research material or analogising them to human embryos. Seeing them as
trans, rather than ‘human ad mixed’ renders explicit their speciﬁc trajectories
and functions and illuminates why attempts to shoe-horn them into the pre-
existing categories of human or animal in order to legally regulate them are
doomed to failure. This is because trans-embryos, as quintessentially queer
creatures, engage in what Haraway calls the activity of ‘queering’ – ‘the job
of undoing “normal” categories’. Of these tasks she states, ‘[n]one is more
critical than the human/nonhuman sorting operation’.6 As we shall see in
the context of legislating to govern their creation and use, trans-embryos
3See, for instance, Jonathan Safran Foer, Eating Animals (Little Brown, 2010); David Nibert, Animal Oppres-
sion and Human Violence: Domescration, Capitalism and Global Conﬂict (Columbia University Press, 2013).
4This is an issue I consider further with Michael Thomson in ‘Bodily Integrity and the Regulation of Parental
Choice’ (work in progress).
5Phillip A Bernhardt-House, ‘The Werewolf as Queer, the Queer as Werewolf and Queer Werewolfs’ in
Noreen Giffney and Myra J Hird (eds), Queering the Non/Human (Ashgate, 2008) 139–84.
6Donna Haraway, ‘Companion Species, Mis-recognition, and Queer Worlding’ in Noreen Giffney and Myra J
Hird (eds), Queering the Non/Human (Ashgate, 2008), xxiii–xxvi.
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reveal much of the arbitrariness which has accompanied such sorting
manoeuvres in health law in the United Kingdom (UK).
The difﬁculties in slotting these extra corporeal embryos into pre-existing
legal categories which are ﬁrmly grounded in the animal/human dichotomy
seems to point to the need for new and more hybrid legal categories. Thus,
rather than advocating personhood for non-humans – a dangerous argument
for feminist politics when embryos are at stake –my argument is that the fault
lines revealed by legislating for trans-embryos requires us to rethink law’s
approach to persons and bodies, and speciﬁcally its unreﬂective privileging
of the human. In thinking through the relation of trans-embryos to the
human-animal boundary, I aim to re-cast trans-embryos as embodied and
relational products of human and animal reproductive labour. So understood
I argue that they reveal the corporeality and vulnerability we humans – and
particularly female humans – share with animals. Read in this way I
suggest that the difﬁculties encountered by law in grappling with the regu-
lation of trans-embryos call into question assumptions that the human
body or indeed the human embryo are special. I conclude that debates over
how we regulate trans-embryos highlight the need for new forms of legal sub-
jectivity since these can no longer legitimately be grounded in the accident of
being born human.
2. Bringing bodies into law
Of course, it must be acknowledged that it is not just in the case of creatures gen-
erated through technoscience that law struggles to recognise the embodied and
relational nature of living entitles. Even for those unambiguously categorised as
human, law has grappled with questions of status.7 In the case of humans whom
it deems persons, law, together with cognate disciplines like bioethics, has long
faced accusations of neglecting or inadequately conceptualising the body.8 In its
infancy, the ﬁeld of health law, for all its practical concern with interventions on
bodies and preoccupation with questions of personhood that are intractably
enmeshed with bodily identity,9 nevertheless neglected corporeality. Yet, as
Therese Murphy and I have suggested, as health lawmatured it came to be inﬂu-
enced by a strand of feminist commentary which positioned the body itself as a
7Law’s travails with how to categorise ‘marginal’ humans such as the fetus, or humans in a persistent vege-
tative state, are well documented; see, e.g. Sheryl Hamilton, Impersonations: Troubling the Person in Law
and Culture, (University of Toronto Press, 2009).
8Therese Murphy, ‘Feminism on Flesh’ (1997) 8 Law and Critique 37; Ruth Fletcher, Marie Fox and Julie
McCandless, ‘Legal Embodiment: Analysing the Body of Healthcare Law’ (2008) 16 Medical Law
Review 321; Rosalyn Diprose, ‘The Body Bioethics Forgets’ in Paul Komasoreff (ed), Troubled Bodies: Criti-
cal Perspectives on Postmodernism, Medical Ethics and the Body (Duke University Press, 1995) 202–21.
9Mitch Travis, ‘Non-normative Bodies, Rationality, and Legal Personhood’ (2014) 22 Medical Law Review
526; Hamilton (n 7).
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contested site.10 Beginning with feminist analyses of the bodies of women, and
particularly their reproductive bodies,11 over time health law has become popu-
lated by a diverse array of bodies, encompassing men’s and children’s bodies,12
intersex and transgender bodies,13 disabled, transabled and dying bodies,14
embryonic, non normative and technologised bodies.15 Legal scholarship has
examined how these varied bodies are represented, constructed and regulated
by health law. Bringing bodies into health law in this way has served to
contest representations of legal subjectivity as universal and disembodied, and
positioned the body as ‘the locus for rights, dignity and identity’.16
Yet, strikingly, this growing cast of bodies in health law remains almost
exclusively human, with the bodies of non-humans ﬁguring only at its
margins, in discussions of technologies like xenotransplantation. Indeed,
even explorations of such technologies which explicitly trouble the bounded-
ness and integrity of human bodies, rarely take animal bodies as the speciﬁc
focus of analysis or explicitly interrogate the human/animal boundary.17
Health law thus remains a discipline enmeshed in liberal humanism, accord-
ing to which the designation ‘human’ determines who or what gets to count
morally and politically. Increasingly, however, this human exceptionalism
seems unsustainable in the fact of technological challenge. Even relatively
mundane biomedical technologies, such as prosthetics or pacemakers, serve
to problematise notions of the natural or corporeal body.18 Thus, some
10Marie Fox and Therese Murphy, ‘The Body, Bodies, Embodiment: Feminist, Legal Engagement with
Health’ in Margaret Davies and Vanessa Munro (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist
Legal Theory (Ashgate, 2013) 249–67.
11Kathy De Gama, ‘A Brave New World? Rights Discourse and the Politics of Reproductive Autonomy’
(1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 114; Isabel Karpin, ‘Legislating the Female Reproductive Body:
Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed Woman’, (1992–3) 3 Columbia Journal of Gender
and Law 325; Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart, 2001).
12Jo Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Healthcare Law (Cambridge University Press,
2007); Michael Thomson, Endowed: Regulating the Male Sexed Body (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).
13Sharon Cowan, ‘Gender is No Substitute for Sex: A Comparative Human Rights Analysis of the Legal
Regulation of Sexual Identity’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 67; Emily Grabham, ‘Bodily Integrity
and the Surgical Management of Intersex’ (2012) 18 Body & Society 1.
14Isabel Karpin and Roxane Mykitiuk, ‘Going Out On a Limb: Prosthetics, Normalcy and Disputing the
Therapy/Enhancement Distinction’ (2008) 16 Medical Law Review 391; Robin MacKenzie, ‘Somatechnics
of Medico-Legal Taxonomies: Elective Amputation and Transableism’ (2008) 16 Medical Law Review 390;
Alexandre Baril, ‘Needing to Acquire a Physical Impairment/Disability: (Re)Thinking the Connections
between Trans and Disability Studies through Transability’ (2015) 30 Hypatia 30; Hazel Biggs, ‘“I
Don’t Want to be a Burden!” A Feminist Reﬂects on Women’s Experience of Death and Dying’, in
Sally Sheldon and Michael Thomson (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Law (Cavendish 1998)
279–95.
15Travis (n 9).
16Lisa C Ikemota, ‘“Race to Health”: Racialised Discourses in a Transhuman World’ (2005) 9 De Paul Journal
of Healthcare Law 1101.
17Monographs on the subject typically address other human-centred concerns: see Sheila McLean and
Laura Williamson, Xenotransplantation: Law and Ethics (Ashgate, 2005); A Persson and S Welin, Contested
Technologies: Xenotransplantation and Human Embryonic Stem Cells (Nordic Academic Press, 2008); Sara
Fovargue, Xenotransplantation and Risk: Regulating a Developing Biotechnology (Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
18Cassandra S Crawford, Phantom Limb: Amputation, Embodiment and Prosthetic Technology (New York
University Press, 2014).
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legal scholars, inﬂuenced by disability studies, have argued that our recent
preoccupation with corporeality obscures how it is actually the social body,
which is integral to our lived experience, that matters, and not the corporeal
organic body. In this vein, Gowri Ramachandran’s work exposes the fallacy
that our bodies are physically continuous, biologically determined, and
organic. Rather, highlighting the artiﬁce that attends human bodies, she con-
tends they are more accurately characterised as potentially discontinuous,
socially constructed cyborgs 19 composed of organic and inorganic portions.20
Seeking to expand the concept of the body beyond its traditionally
understood borders,21 Ramachandran invokes the experience of humans
with disabilities, who have described coming to experience assisted
devices as part of their bodies.22 Having demonstrated that prosthetics
expose the blurriness of the boundary between what is and what is not
part of the body,23 she goes on to show that increasing numbers of us
might now be regarded as cyborgs, as we become ever more dependent
on extra-corporeal devices, including smart phones, which prove difﬁcult
to distinguish from prosthetics. Her analysis seems to vindicate Donna
Haraway’s famous claim that we are all cyborgs now.24 Nevertheless,
while acknowledging the need to complicate the organic, natural and
bounded body, I would contend that it is important to hold on to the cor-
poreality and materiality of bodies, as well as their social nature, since all of
these aspects demonstrate the continuities between human and non-human
animal bodies which law strives to deny.
The meaning of that corporeality and materiality is, however, inevitably
complicated in a universe of transbiology, which Franklin deﬁnes as a
‘world of cyborgs’ encompassing tissue engineering, reproductive medicine,
cloning and stem cell science. This is a world:
made up out of the complex intersection of the pure and impure, where quality
and biological control are literally merged to create new kinds of organisms…
the transbiological is not just about new mixtures, playful recombinations of
parts or new assemblages: it is fundamentally deﬁned by the effort to differen-
tiate these dirty descent lines into functional, safe and marketable human
biology.25
19Haraway described cyborgs as ‘a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as
ﬁction’: Donna Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the
1980s’ (1985) 15 Feminist Review 65, 65.
20Gowri Ramachandran, ‘Assault and Battery on Property’ (2010) 44 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 253,
257.
21ibid 258.
22Sarah S Jain, ‘The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling and Disabling the Prosthetic Trope’ (1999) 24 Science,
Technology & Human Values 31.
23Ramachandran (n 20) 266.
24ibid.
25Sarah Franklin, ‘The Cyborg Embryo: Our Path to Transbiology’ (2006) 23 Theory, Culture and Society 167,
176.
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Indeed, suggesting that cyborgs are merely one facet of the extensive co-min-
gling enabled by transbiology, Rosi Braidotti argues that it generates what she
calls ‘post anthropocentric technobodies’.26 These include cloned animals
such as Dolly the sheep, as well as the assortment of trans-embryos combining
various different mixes of human and animal material which are my focus. All
of these entities pose challenging regulatory questions. More importantly they
also call the meaning of normative boundaries – including the therapeutic/
non-therapeutic and organic/inorganic as well as the human/animal – into
play. To that extent I suggest that trans-embryos are useful for an enquiry
concerned to question such boundaries, and the role of legislation in main-
taining or shoring them up.
3. Legislating the trans-embryo
The creation of trans-embryos under licence was controversially sanctioned
by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFE Act 2008),
which designates them as ‘human admixed embryos’. This reform resulted
from a campaign in which scientists had touted such embryos as a solution
to the shortage of human gametes, and hence human embryos, available for
research purposes. In other discourses, including media and policy discourses
it seems to me that these embryos were represented paradoxically. To some
degree they were conceived as mere research tools – something considerably
less than human. However, more prominent depictions echoed scientiﬁc dis-
course in casting them as surrogates for human embryos. In Charis Thomp-
son’s words, they were seen as ‘classic substitutive research subjects’.27
Although this science-inﬂected strategy sought to normalise trans-embryos
as akin to human embryos and thus essentially human, I shall argue that it
never fully succeeded in erasing the hybridity or expunging the traces of
the animal which contaminate trans-embryos. As a result they retain signiﬁ-
cant potential to disrupt our understandings of the human. Consequently, and
notwithstanding how, post 2008, the science of trans-embryo research
appears to have stalled,28 they can usefully facilitate enquiries into whether
humans, or human embryos, possess special features to justify the exception-
alism accorded to them in health law.
Various boundaries drawn around the human body could fruitfully be
explored to challenge human exceptionalism, as Ramachandran demon-
strates.29 Here I focus solely on the boundary which is breached by
26Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Polity Press, 2013) 103.
27Thompson (n 1) 190.
28Richard Alleyne, ‘Controversial Hybrid Embryos Are “No Use to Science” New Research Suggests’ Daily
Telegraph (London, 3 February 2009); Thompson (n 1) suggests that ‘cybrid work had ﬁzzled out by
the end of 2011’, 203. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/science-news/4446595/Controversial-
hybrid-embryos-are-no-use-to-science-new-research-suggests.html (accessed 3 November 2015).
29Ramachandran (n 20).
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incorporating animal material into human bodies, since as Alex Sharpe
suggests: ‘In the contemporary context, it is perhaps challenges to the
human/animal distinction that represent the greatest perceived threat to the
notion of human identity’.30 To this I would add that forms of transbiology
which disrupt species boundaries not only raise questions about technological
meddling with the human body and consequent threats to human identity, but
about the ethics of co-opting animal bodies to enhance our lives. Perhaps the
most obvious manifestations of these disruptions in contemporary tech-
noscience are the xenotransplant recipient and the trans-embryo. Each
ﬁgure highlights law’s unease with trans-species creatures who breach both
bodily boundaries and the species barrier. Elsewhere I have explored the mul-
tiple challenges to species, generational and bodily boundaries that are posed
by xenotechnologies.31 Maneesha Deckha has suggested that they generate
‘species anxiety’ because ‘the humans involved become “animalized” and
thus absorb the subordinate status assigned in Western cultures to nonhu-
mans in general’. Consequently she argues that xenotechnologies help
expose the contingency of the entire ediﬁce of human identity that underpins
Western law.32
Yet, while the xenotransplant recipient undoubtedly remains a challenging
ﬁgure for the humanist discipline of health law, s/he nevertheless remains
ontologically and morphologically predominantly human. Ultimately there-
fore ‘law proves able to accommodate the human [xenograft] recipient
within the legal order’.33 By contrast, the ability of scientists to increase the
human composition of trans-embryos dramatically34 means that they dis-
mantle traditional concepts of personhood, as well as species. The trans-
embryo thus outﬂanks the xenotransplant recipient by posing a more pro-
found challenge to the human/animal dichotomy, which serves to call legal
subjectivity into question. As Susan Squier notes, they are ‘perhaps the
most unsettling of… liminal lives’.35 To an even greater extent than other
cyborg embryos, they exist in a liminal position on the frontiers of the
human, literally on a threshold ‘betwixt-and-between the moral, day to day,
cultural and social stages and processes of getting and spending, preserving
law and order and registering social status’.36
30Alex Sharpe, Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of Law (Routledge, 2010) 130.
31Marie Fox, ‘Rethinking the Animal/Human Boundary: the Impact of Xeno Technologies’ (2005) 26 Liver-
pool Law Review 149.
32Maneesha Deckha, ‘Holding onto Humanity: Animals, Dignity and Anxiety in Canada’s Assisted Human
Reproduction Act’ (2009) 5 Unbound 21, 32–23.
33Sharpe (n 30) 140.
34Nina Kopinski, ‘Human-Nonhuman Chimera: A Regulatory Proposal on the Blurring of Species Lines’
[2003–4] Boston College Law Review 619.
35Susan Squier, Liminal Lives: Imaging the Human at the Frontiers of Biomedicine (Duke University Press,
2004) 90.
36ibid ch 1; Victor Turner, ‘Frame, Flow and Reﬂection: Ritual and Drama as Public Liminality’ in M
Benamou and C Caramello (eds), Postmodern Culture (Coda Press, 1977) 33.
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The ability of these embryos to sow confusion is exacerbated by the variety
of human/animal hybrids and the sometimes confusing terminology
employed to describe them. In the run up to the adoption of the HFE Act
2008, media and Parliamentary attention in the UK focused exclusively on
the category of Cytoplasmic Hybrid Embryos (cybrids) which are created
using somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). Replicating the cloning technol-
ogy employed to produce Dolly the sheep,37 the nucleus of a human adult
cell, such as a skin cell, is inserted into an enucleated animal egg, which is
then activated so that it begins to divide, and allows stem cells to be
derived from it. The cybrid that results from this process will be more than
99% human (a claim which as we will see was rhetorically signiﬁcant in the
passage of permissive amendments to the relevant law). Yet, because a
small amount of animal DNA will be left behind in the mitochondrial struc-
ture outside the nucleus, it will not be fully human.38 Scientists had asserted
the need for such cybrids due to the shortage of human eggs being donated for
research purposes. Creating cybrids enables researchers to derive patient-
speciﬁc human embryonic stem cell lines without human eggs. Crucially
this allows techniques to be perfected on trans-embryos rather than wasting
precious human embryos. They thus exemplify Thompson’s observation
that animals have been used as stand-ins for humans in medical experimen-
tation throughout the history of Western medicine.39
I have argued elsewhere that, by cleverly mobilising the media, scientists,
policymakers and bodies such as the BMA were able to deploy certain rhetori-
cal strategies to support and promote this research in a manner that was to
prove decisive in UK Parliamentary debates. This strategy outﬂanked opposi-
tion, which was portrayed as reactionary and inﬂected by religious objection.
Thus, for instance, discourses of faith and hope were mobilised to promote the
scientiﬁc potential of trans-embryos; the use of animal-human hybrids in
research was normalised by locating the development of trans-embryos as
part of an established research lineage; and the potential of possible alterna-
tives, such as adult stem cells or stem cells derived from cord blood, was
downplayed. Proponents of trans-embryo research also highlighted the exist-
ence of good regulatory structures, while suggesting that a failure to legislate
would generate legal uncertainty which would encourage unscrupulous
researchers.40 Most critically of all and motivated by the desire to ensure
that the human admixed embryo would thereby come within the jurisdiction
of the HFE Act 2008, advocates of this research sought to allay concerns about
37Sarah Franklin, Dolly Mixtures: The Remaking of Genealogy (Duke University Press, 2007).
38Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Hybrids and Chimeras: A Consultation on the Ethical and
Social Implications of Creating Human/Animal Embryos in Research (Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority, 2007) 8.
39Thompson (n 1) 190.
40Marie Fox, ‘Legislating Interspecies Embryos’ in Stephen Smith and Ronan Deazley (eds), The Legal,
Medical and Cultural Regulation of the Body: Transformation and Transgression (Ashgate, 2009) 95–126.
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hybridity and its associated challenges by representing trans-embryos as
essentially human. Thus, in Parliamentary debates Lord Walton emphasised
that, unlike proper chimeras, the admixed embryo was 99.95% human:
The animal component is simply the capsule in which that nucleus has been
implanted. That is a very minor component, so it is properly called a human
admixed embryo.41
Parliamentary and media discourse was replete with similar assertions of what
Brown calls ‘ontological gerrymandering’,42 since these ‘metric calculation[s]
of humanness’ inevitably lapse into ‘the contingencies of counting and the cat-
egorical judgments that structure what is and is not an accountable cat-
egory’.43 Given how the ontological status of the embryo was most certainly
up for grabs in these debates, they also reveal how certain forms of embryo
are brought into being or enacted through legislative processes.44
The outcome was that a key reform measure set out in s 4(6) of the HFE
Act 2008, permitted the creation, under licence, of ‘human admixed
embryos’, which the section deﬁned as:
(a) embryos created by replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or of an
animal egg or of an animal cell, or two animal pronuclei, with two
human pronuclei, one nucleus of a human gamete or of any human
cell, or one human gamete or other human cell,
(b) any other embryo created by using –
(i) human gametes and animal gametes, or
(ii) one human pronucleus and one animal pronecleus,
(c) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of any
sequence of nuclear or mitchondrial DNA of an animal into one or
more cells of the embryo
(d) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of one or more
animal cells, or
(e) any embryo not falling within para (a) to (d) which contains both nuclear
or mitochondrial DNA of animal… but in which the animal DNA is not
predominant.
Clearly then the range of trans-species embryos permitted by the legis-
lation extends well beyond the cybrid embryo which had garnered the
attention of the media and Parliamentarians in the run up to the adoption
41Human Fertilisation & Embryology Bill 15 January 2008, col 1190.
42See Steve Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch, ‘Ontological Gerrymandering’ (1985) 32 Social Problems 214.
43Nik Brown, ‘Beasting the Embryo: The Metrics of Humanness in the Transpecies Embryo Debate’ (2009) 4
Biosocieties 147.
44See Woolgar and Javier Lezaun, ‘The Wrong Bin Bag? A Turn to Ontology in Science and Technology
Studies?’ (2013) 43 Social Studies of Science 231.
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of the HFE Act 2008. While cybrids might fairly be described as ‘human
admixed’, the term is simply not an accurate description of chimeras
(where animal cells are added to the human embryo), transgenic
embryos (where animal DNA is inserted into the cells of a human
embryo) or, most radically of all, true hybrids (formed by the fusing of
human and animal gametes). Essentially then UK law now permits any
trans-embryo to be created under licence provided that the animal com-
ponent is not predominant. As Brown observes, in permitting the whole-
sale creation of these various embryos, the HFE Act 2008 is ‘at odds with
the ubiquitous claim that cybrid embryos were largely human and there-
fore morally more legitimate [than other human/animal crosses]’.45 This
legislative endorsement of new research subjects which emphatically
cannot be classiﬁed as ‘essentially human’ also illustrates the malleability
of the category ‘human’ – an issue to which we will return below.
In the ﬁnal stages of the Parliamentary debates, Brown’s accusation of ger-
rymandering was borne out by the UK Government’s response when chal-
lenged about these last minute amendments to the bill.46 Mark Simonds, a
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP), noted that the government’s ‘shift-
ing position seems to undermine any consistent ethical position on admixed
embryos’. Confronting then Labour Government Health Minister Dawn Pri-
marolo with the logic of the government’s earlier position that cybrids were
special, he attacked the broader proposal which would allow true hybrid
embryos:
The true hybrid is not always at the human end of the spectrum. There is an
ethical difference between a cell that is 99 per cent human and one that is 50
per cent human. Where is the principle for having a cut-off point of 50 per
cent? Should it be 50 per cent, 51 per cent, or 49 per cent?47
In responding, Primarolo resorted somewhat unconvincingly to claims about
the ‘irrelevance’ of the particular form that human/animal mixing takes:
once we mix in any elements of animal, the principle of using hybrids for
research purposes is established… once we go down that road – which we
already have – it seems illogical to rule something out because of a particular
mix.48
45ibid. Indeed, as Brown (n 43) notes, in any event this reading depended on a particular, problematic (and
gendered) reading of the contribution of the nonhuman mitochondrial DNA of the ova, according to
which the nuclear DNA of the cell inserted into egg would be determinative. Similar readings have
informed concerns about so-called three parent in vitro fertilisation involving cytoplasmic transfer in
which mitochondrial DNA is donated by a third party. These concerns are indicative of more generalised
anxieties that embryos are bounded, not just in terms of species, but also genetic composition.
46As I have noted elsewhere this was only the latest of several U-turns in the Government’s position on
trans embryos over the course of the reform process. See Fox (n 40).
47Human Fertilisation & Embryology Bill 19 May 2008, col 50.
48ibid col 57.
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Ultimately, however, in conceding the force of slippery slope arguments in
this context she was forced to acknowledge that section 4(6) of the HFE
Act 2008 amounted to a failure of boundary work:
[I]n searching around to put the argument on an ethical basis that drew the
lines in ethics and science the Government has to admit that we were simply
wrong in our original position [that true hybrids were distinguishable from
cybrids and should be prohibited].49
Similar problems in boundary setting have bedevilled attempts to legislate on
this issue elsewhere. For instance, the Human-Animal Hybrid Prohibition Bill
which was introduced to the US Congress in 2009, unsuccessfully sought to
prohibit the introduction of human stem cells to animals. In contrast to the
parliamentary debates in the UK, Senator Samuel Brownback was clear
about the boundary work entailed when he introduced the Bill. He stated
explicitly, ‘it has a direct bearing upon the very essence of what it means to
be human, and it draws a bright line with respect to how far we can go’.
Yet, as Thompson has shown, the proposed US legislation also countenanced
the continuance of all kinds of human-animal mixing, thereby highlighting
the difﬁculties faced by legislators in holding fast to bright lines in this
murky ﬁeld.50
Strategising around legislative reform proposals thus illustrates the limits
of attempts to legally police ‘the human’. It also shows how law is implicated
in the ontological constitution of the human,51 notwithstanding attempts by
politicians to portray legal reforms in this ﬁeld as pragmatic regulatory ques-
tions. Thus, and perhaps mindful of litigation over the precise deﬁnition of the
human embryo in the wake of the HFE Act 1990 (the 1990 Act),52 the UK
Government resorted to a pragmatic position, exempliﬁed by Primarolo’s
statement that the key aim of the 2008 amendments to the 1990 Act was
simply to ‘ensure that all new forms of embryos that may be developed that
contain both human and animal DNA will, where the animal DNA does
not predominate, fall within the regulation’.53 The legislative process to
permit the creation and use of trans-embryos in the UK thus exempliﬁes
the difﬁculties of holding fast to species categories in any principled or
logical manner when faced with such a liminal entity. It also illustrates how
in endorsing a shift in regulatory boundaries law, as well as technoscience,
enacts the human.
49ibid col 58.
50Thompson (n 1) 204.
51See Woolgar and Lezaun (n 44) 334.
52For an overview see Martin Johnson, ‘Escaping the Tyranny of the Embryo? A New Approach to ART
Regulation Based On UK and Australian Experiences’ (2006) 11 Human Reproduction 2756.
53HC (n 47) col 59.
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3.1 The unruly embryo and the undoing of categories
Although the UK Government ultimately dispensed with its strategy of recup-
erating the trans-embryo as essentially human, it had constituted a necessary
staging post in preparing the way for legal reform. The starting place for the
debates preceding the HFE Act 2008 had been the prohibitions contained in
sections 3 and 4 of the 1990 Act, which had adamantly ruled out any form of
cross species mixing, with the very limited exception of the so-called hamster
test for motility of sperm.54 Together with reproductive cloning and research-
ing on embryos after 14 days, cross-species mixings were expressly singled out
as objects of censure by the 1990 Act. Indeed, the provisions prohibiting
trans-species mixing had constituted some of the clearest examples of UK
law’s boundary work in shoring up the human/animal dichotomy.55 Thus,
Brown positions the banning of trans-embryos as completely foundational
to the 1990 Act, noting that ‘in the debate leading up to the Act the trans-
species embryo ﬁgures as an unimaginable abhorrence and the subject of
urgent prohibitive legislation’.56 Sharpe attributes such abhorrence to the
fact that trans-embryos embody a double breach of nature and law, which
locates them within the lineage of Foucauldian monsters:
Human/animal admixed embryos can be considered monsters because they
meet Foucault’s monster conditions… They involve a breach of nature
because the process of their creation entails mixing human and animal. They
involve a breach of the law because mixing of this kind introduces a profound
challenge to key legal distinctions … The confusion that human/animal
hybrids introduce to the law can be considered to be of themost profound kind.57
As such, overturning the ban on cross-species mixing represented a serious
U-turn, symptomatic of the category crisis that Sharpe’s work on monstrosity
explores. To facilitate this complete policy reversal, the monstrous and hybrid
character of the trans-embryo had to be nulliﬁed. This was accomplished by
analogising it to the by-now familiar and normalised ﬁgure of the human
embryo. Drawing such a parallel seems in many ways counterintuitive,
since such embryos could only be used for research and typically humans
are much more willing to experiment on and use animals than humans for
research purposes. However, the effect of the argument was to bring the
trans-embryo safely within the regulatory ambit of the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Authority (HFEA), thus ensuring control over the fate of
trans-embryos. Although the strategy of casting the trans-embryo as akin to
the human embryo was abandoned in the ﬁnal stages of the legislative
54This permitted the creation of two cell hybrids using hamster eggs and human sperm purely for the
purposes of testing sperm motility.
55Marie Fox, ‘Re-thinking Kinship: Law’s Construction of the Animal Body’ (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems
464.
56ibid.
57Sharpe (n 30) 138.
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process, it had by then served its purpose by rendering the trans-embryo fam-
iliar, thereby containing the anxiety generated by its breach of categories so
that opposition to its creation and use was muted.
The Government’s eventual concession of a legal failure to draw bright
lines between various types of trans-embryos serves both to illustrate Bruno
Latour’s observation that embryos are ‘unruly’58 and to demonstrate the dif-
ﬁculty of sorting embryos into existing legal or regulatory categories such as
research and reproduction, human and animal and so forth.59 The liminal
nature of trans-embryos carries a particular power to destabilise or disrupt
legal categories, and as the history of the passage of the HFE Act 2008
reveals, they resist a straightforward regulatory response. Thus, the series of
regulatory U-turns and evasions over the course of the various consultations
and the Parliamentary process exemplify the difﬁculties in containing trans-
embryos given their tendency to ‘exceed and overﬂow’.60 Braidotti has
suggested that Dolly the cloned sheep represents the ‘ideal ﬁguration for
the complex, bio-mediated temporalities and forms of intimacy that rep-
resents the new post-anthropocentric human-animal interaction’.61 Her
observation applies equally to the trans-embryo which similarly ‘embodies
complexity, this entity which is no longer an animal but not yet fully a
machine’62 rendering it too emblematic of the posthuman condition.
As we have seen, the accompanying potential to confuse and unravel con-
cepts makes it appropriate to characterize inter-species embryos as ‘trans’. As
Franklin notes, Haraway uses this term to signify more than a simple move
from one state to another, but ‘to describe the shape-shifting categories by
which new hybrid entities… blast widely understood notions of natural
limits or kind’.63 To this, Franklin adds that the label ‘trans’ also connotes
‘the transwork of embryo transfer, and the translation of embryology into
stem cell derivation and redirection’.64 These, of course, are the very transbiol-
ogies invoked to justify the creation of trans-embryos, and which, as Franklin
observes, could never have been imagined without the extra corporeal
embryo.65 Building on their insights I would add that the label ‘trans’ also
signals the queer status of trans-embryos and we have seen them play a
role in the task of queering prior categories, as envisaged by Bernhardt
House.66 These tasks include Haraway’s critical ‘human/nonhuman sorting
58Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard University Press, 1993).
59See Marie Fox and Sheelagh McGuinness, ‘The Politics of Muddling Through: Categorizing Embryos’ in C
Stanton et al (eds), Pioneering Healthcare Law: Essays in Honour of the Work of Margaret Brazier (Routle-
dge, 199–210).
60Sarah Franklin, ‘Response to Marie Fox and Therese Murphy’ (2010) 19 Social and Legal Studies 505.
61Braidotti (n 26) 74.
62ibid.
63Franklin (n 25) 169–70.
64ibid 171.
65ibid 174.
66See Bernhardt-House (n 5).
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operation’ noted above.67 Certainly, the process of legislating to govern the
creation and use of trans-embryos reveals much of the arbitrariness which
attends such sorting manoeuvres, thereby calling its legitimacy into question.
In serving to undo the category of human, I would suggest that even those
of us concerned about the potential of technoscience to materially harm non-
humans, by, inter alia, dreaming up ever more ingenious ways to consume
animal bodies and animal bodily products, should acknowledge that the cre-
ation of trans-embryos carries a progressive potential. In the remainder of this
paper, I seek to show how their power to transgress can be co-opted in posi-
tive ways to problematise human exceptionalism and the exploitation of non-
human others, which such exceptionalism facilitates.
4. Challenging human exceptionalism
The capacity of trans-embryos for transgression and queering was evident in
the HFE Act 2008. As we have seen, attempts to regulate them effectively
unravelled the clear distinction between them and the ‘human embryo’,
which in the earlier HFE Act 1990 had been decisively marked off from
any embryos containing animal material. A key platform of pro-life argu-
ments as regards embryos is that membership of the community of humanity
mandates ethical regard for human embryos.68 Interestingly, as Franklin has
observed of the debates preceding the HFE Act 1990, a foundational assump-
tion agreed by all sides in the UK Parliamentary debates was that the embryo
was human and a being and, as such, the law must respect its status.69 Such
arguments and assumptions demonstrate the ideological power that the
status ‘human’ carries. As Diana Fuss argues of this linguistic, cultural and
socio-political construct:
In the past, ‘the human’ has functioned as a powerful judicial trope to disen-
franchise slaves, immigrants, women, children and the poor… ‘The human’
continues to be deployed as weapon of potent ideological force, its unstable
boundaries perpetually challenged and redrawn to exclude entire groups of
socially disempowered subjects: the homeless, mothers on welfare, blacks in
prison, people with HIV/AIDS, illegal ‘aliens’.70
Because of this exclusionary logic, ‘the human’ has never has been an inclusive
category, but has necessitated continual redrafting of the dividing lines
between humans and ‘non-humans’.71 Indeed, as recently as 2006, Catherine
67See Haraway (n 6) xxiv.
68Helen Watt, ‘Potential and the Early Human’ (1996) 22 Journal of Medical Ethics 222.
69Sarah Franklin, ‘Making Representations: The Parliamentary Debate on the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act’ in Jeanette Edwards et al, Technologies of Procreation: Kinship in the Age of Assisted Con-
ception (Manchester University Press, 1993) 96–131.
70Diana Fuss, ‘Introduction’ in Diana Fuss (ed) Human All Too Human (Routledge 1996) 2.
71See also Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science (Verso,
1989–92) 7.
LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 219
MacKinnon concluded that women continue to be confronted with denial of
their humanity, and have yet to fully accomplish the process of becoming
human:
Becoming human is a social, legal and political process. It requires prohibiting
or otherwise deligitimating all acts by which human beings as such are violated,
guaranteeing people what they need for a fully human existence… But…
seeing what subordinated groups are distinctively deprived of, subjected to,
and deligitimated by, requires ﬁrst that they be real to power: that they ﬁrst
be seen as human… The status and treatment of men still tacitly but authori-
tatively deﬁnes the human universal.72
Yet while the human status of women is still judged wanting in comparison to
men, I would argue that it is ultimately animals who function to deﬁne the
human – quite simply the human is that which the animal is not. Thus,
Joanna Zylinska posits that:
the question of the animal is fundamental to any enquiry into culture, politics
and ethics today because of the animal’s role as a ‘constitutive outside’ in the
dominant Western conceptions of moral and political philosophy. The
generic animality of the animal has served as a fault line against which the
humanity and superiority of the human – including the ability of humans to
order the world according to their own categories of preferences and pleasure
– have been ascertained.73
For Zylinkska and other theorists, human and animals are embedded and
mutually constitutive categories, and Jacques Derrida suggests that we main-
tain the status of the ‘human’ only by a violent abjection, destruction and dis-
avowal of the ‘animal’.74 Similarly, for Giorgio Agamben the conceptual
separation of animal from human constituted a form of ‘originary ban’ –
an exercise of biopower which enabled the human animal to exclude other
animals from the life of the polis.75 Thus, Anne Schillmoler argues, the con-
tinued existence of the human depends to a signiﬁcant extent on the sacriﬁce
of the animal and humanism and the ideal of the human have been con-
structed through processes of exclusion, foreclosures and radical erasures.76
These exclusionary processes and criteria have been well documented, as
72Catherine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (Harvard University Press, 2006) 1–3; see also Joanna Burke,
What It Means to be Human (Virago, 2011). Interestingly MacKinnon’s conception of human status as an
accomplishment echoes Woolgar and Lezaun’s argument problematising the taken for granted status of
the human and arguing that is has to be achieved: see (n 42) 324.
73Joanna Zylinska, Bioethics in the Age of New Media (MIT Press, 2009) 116.
74Jacques Derrida, ‘Eating Well or The Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida’ in
Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds), Who Comes After the Subject? (Routledge,
1991), 96–119.
75Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, On Sovereign Power and Naked Life (Stanford University Press, 1995) 7.
76Anne Schillmoller, ‘Gaining Ground: Towards a Discourse of Posthuman Animality: A Geophilosophical
Journey’ (2011) 14 Southern Cross University Law Review 41, 55.
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has the manner in which those markers traditionally invoked to separate
humans from animals (such as self-consciousness, rationality, language use,
tool-making capacity, the possession of culture etc.) are fallible. Various
animal behaviouralists have contested such criteria by proving that certain
animals do possess these capacities, at least to a limited extent. For instance,
primates, dolphins, elephants and parrots have all been taught rudimentary
(human) language skills.77 Consequently, growing knowledge of animal
behaviour itself contributes to shifting notions of what it means to be
human, and exposes the contingency of these boundaries.
Yet, as philosopher Stephen Clark contends,78 once animals are shown to
possess any of the qualities we have hitherto designated as a mark of human-
ness, such as speech,79 we immediately reﬁne our notion of what does consti-
tute human qualities and revise that account upwards. In any event, since
humans select the criteria upon which other animals will be judged, any
tests devised are bound to be anthropocentric. As Barbara Noske observes,
‘[i]n having to pass our tests, as measured by our yardsticks, they will
always come out second best, namely, as reduced humans’.80 And here
again there are clearly resonances between the treatment of women and
animals, with Cynthia Willetts arguing that like animals ‘women too have
been associated with inferior moral status by the phallogocentric pairing of
maleness with reason’.81
Of course, in the case of embryos, questions of rationality, language etc. do
not, at least while they remain in embryonic form, come into play. Further-
more, the HFE Act 1990 had, by casting human embryos as essentially
research material, made it easier to countenance the blurring of boundaries
between them and embryos containing animal material. Indeed, and reﬂecting
the tensions about casting them as human that we noted above, Brown has
observed that paradoxically the HFE Act 1990 seemed to afford greater pro-
tection to hybrid embryos than it did to human ones:
It is a cause for concern throughout the debate that the transspecies hybrid is
framed as more distinctive, more special, and singled out for exceptional pro-
tection by being banned. The ban reinforces the hierarchical structure that
places humans over other species by protecting the human from the pollution
posed by the incorporation of another species. And yet, at the same time, places
humans in the morally awkward position of being experimental subjects in a
way that transspecies (less than human) embryos are not.82
77Steven Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case of Animal Rights (Perseus, 2002) chs 6, 9, 10.
78Stephen Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford University Press, 1984) x.
79Language ability has played a key role in demarcating humans and animals: see Cary Wolf, What is Post-
humanism? (University of Minnesota Press, 2010) ch 2.
80Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals (Black Rose Books, 1997) 143–4.
81Cynthia Willetts, Interspecies Ethics (Columbia University Press, 2014) 11.
82Brown (n 43) 12.
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Of course, the later HFE Act 2008 removed the paradox identiﬁed by Brown,
but only by raising the spectre of the new trans-embryonic research subject
which law now sanctions. Isabel Karpin has argued that, even though legis-
lation in various jurisdictions has prohibited, or in the case of the UK
sought to contain, the transgressive potential of trans-embryos, such efforts
fail to quell speculation about what the status of a gestated embryo would be:
If the prohibited embryo is brought to life through gestation and birth, one
might ask, how would law adjudicate its value if called upon to do so?
Would its proscription in embryonic form have any impact on its status as a
human person before the law?83
Given law’s investment in maintaining the animal-human boundary it seems
probable that the taint of the animal would rule out claims to personhood and
legal subjectivity for such beings. Even legal strategies, which have carefully
couched their political challenges to this boundary, such as the Great Ape
Project, have made few tangible gains. That project seeks to shift the bound-
aries of who/what counts as human by extending certain human rights (life,
individual liberty and freedom from torture) to certain primates84 rather
than dismantling the boundary. However, Karpin’s provocative and troubling
question about the rights of a trans-embryo if birthed resonates with other cri-
tiques of the narrowness of the rights-bearing subject of conventional human
rights law. As Braidotti observes, ‘we assert our attachment to the species as if
it were a given… [and] construct a fundamental notion of Rights around the
Human’.85 John Harris too has criticised the insertion of the ‘human’ into this
especially valorised form of rights. He contends that this process of according
human rights:
has occurred… thoughtlessly and with… little attention to the prejudice of
which this is an expression and to the extent to which this terminology
makes future generations of beings like us hostages to fortune.86
In consequence, Harris suggests that it is necessary to ‘take the “human” out
of human rights’. His proposal usefully advances the more limited extension
of human rights envisaged by the Great Ape Project, and there is much to
welcome in a broader conception of rights and rights holders. Nevertheless,
I would suggest that something more radical is needed than strategies
designed to extend the discourse of rights to accommodate either privileged
animal species or enhanced humans, as commentators like Singer and
83Isabel Karpin, ‘The Uncanny Embryos: Legal Limits to the Human and Reproduction without Women’
(2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 599, 611.
84Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds), The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity (Fourth Estate,
1993).
85Braidotti (n 26) 1.
86John Harris, ‘Taking the “Human” out of Human Rights’ (2010) 20(1) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics 9.
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Cavalieri and Harris envisage. In formulating a different vision, Braidotti’s
starting place is her embodied kinship with technologically modiﬁed animals:
In the universe I inhabit as a post-industrial subject of so-called advanced capit-
alism there is great deal of familiarity and much in common in the way of
embodied and embedded locations between female humans, oncomouse and
the cloned sheep Dolly.87
Clearly, this argument resonates with MacKinnon’s assertions of women’s
fragile claims to the status ‘human’ and the exclusionary criteria that are
deployed to deﬁne women and animals as lacking in relevant human charac-
teristics. Signiﬁcantly, given our technoscience context, Braidotti highlights
how as a woman she is ‘structurally serviceable and thus closer to the organ-
isms that are willing or unwilling providers of organs or cells than to any
notion of the inviolability and integrity of the human species’.88 Her allusion
to organisms that unwillingly provide organs or cells recalls the two appli-
cations submitted to the HFEA for licences for cybrid research, which pro-
vided the impetus for legal reform.89 A range of species was proposed as
the source of the required animal gametes, but it was envisaged that most
would be derived from cows killed in an abattoir or from rabbits. In the
case of animals reducible to meat, it is scarcely surprising that their bodies
and reproductive products are seen as human resources to be harvested,
and consequently as not giving rise to any signiﬁcant ethical issues. As
Carol Adams has noted of meat-eating patriarchal cultures:
[W]e assimilate into our lives… the expectation that people should eat animals
…As a result the rendering of animals as consumable bodies is one of these
presumptions that undergirds our attitudes.90
In much the same way that feminist scholars have highlighted the devaluing of
women’s embodied and reproductive labour in practices such as egg donation
and cord blood banking,91 the source of animal eggs are even more readily
disregarded given their constitution as meat. In this regard it is noteworthy
that in the course of her empirical work on stem cell research, Thompson
records that two researchers recounted to her how the use of animal eggs
to create cybrids could be regarded as ‘feminist’ given its potential to relieve
the pressure on women to donate eggs.92 Clearly their vision of feminism
admits no space for considering the ways in which the bodies of female
87Braidotti (n 26) 80.
88ibid.
89Mark Henderson, ‘British Scientists Plan Work on Human-Rabbit Embryos’ The Times (London, 13 January
2006). http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article1950831.ece (accessed 3 November 2015)
90Carol Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat (Polity Press, 1990) 14.
91Donna Dickenson, Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ch 2. See
also Anne Phillips, Our Bodies, Whose Property? (Princeton University Press, 2013).
92Thompson (n 1) xx.
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humans and non-human animals alike are consumed.93 Yet, as Braidotti
notes:
In advanced capital, animals of all categories and species have been turned into
tradable, disposable bodies, inscribed in a global market of post-anthropo-
centric exploitation.94
Trying to think beyond the ways in which animals are simply substituted for
female bodies and reproductive products that have hitherto been used in
embryo and stem cell research helps to reveal continuities in how the
bodies of female humans and animals are vulnerable to commodiﬁcation
and exploitation. I would argue that the value of exploring our shared cor-
poreality with animals is one reason why feminist scholars, who have only
just succeeded in bringing bodies into the frame of health law, should resist
an inﬂuential transhumanist movement which advocates transcending or
moving beyond bodies, and in some variants discarding the concept of the
human.95 While I am less worried about jettisoning notions of the human,
I do have concerns about how ‘[t]ranshumanism challenges the corporeal
approach itself’.96 In its emphasis on the power of technology to overcome
bodily limitations, the material body itself becomes a casualty, as evidenced
in Katherine Hayles’ assertion that ‘embodiment in a biological substrate is
seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life’.97 Cary
Wolf has rightly accused her of opposing embodiment to the posthuman,
and associating the latter ‘with a kind of triumphalist disembodiment’.98
For health lawyers, I argue that a more productive course is to engage with
strands of posthumanist discourse which emphasise our shared corporeality –
and associated vulnerabilities – with the non-human. Accounts of the posthu-
man like those offered by Wolf and Braidotti serve to more effectively call the
borders of the human into question and are attentive to questions of subjec-
tivity, including who gets to count as a legal subject. Tracking legal responses
to trans-embryos highlights law’s resistance to according legal subjectivity and
protection to at least certain kinds of posthuman beings, suggesting that the
issue of legal subjectivity needs to be rethought to better accommodate the
93Elsewhere I have pointed to the curious reluctance within feminist legal scholarship to acknowledge
such human-animal continuity, and how the fact that this binary remains unchallenged even within
scholarship dedicated to dismantling such boundaries testiﬁes to its entrenchment: see Fox (n 44).
94Braidotti (n 26) 70.
95For an overview of transhumanism see Max More and Natasha Vita-More, The Transhumanist Reader:
Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology and Philosophy of the Future (Wiley-Black-
well, 2013). Key texts include Harold W Baillie and Timothy K Casey (eds), Is Human Nature Obsolete?
Genetics, Bioengineering and the Future of the Human Condition (MIT Press, 2004); Joel Garreau,
Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies – and What It Means to
Be Human (Random House, 2005); John Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better
People (Princeton University Press, 2007).
96Ikemota (n 16) 1109.
97N Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman (University of Chicago Press, 1999) 2.
98Wolf (n 79) xv.
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beings that technoscience is now capable of producing, and to think through
our ethical responsibility to them. Moreover I would add that a value to think-
ing more carefully about our ethical approach to nonhumans is the potential
this carries to foster a more caring and nuanced approach towards our obli-
gations to humans.
5. Containing and re-thinking the trans-embryo
As we have seen, notwithstanding the efforts of the Great Ape Project and
other initiatives,99 law has proven resistant to the idea of conferring person-
hood or subjectivity on entities that do not ﬁt established humanist norms. As
Braidotti has argued, all modes of embodiment other than the idealised mas-
culine body are cast out of the subject position.100 Even when boundaries are
redrawn in the face of technological change and scientiﬁc imperatives and
thereby disrupt such norms, as in the case of the HFE Act 2008, law can
still serve to contain the transgressive potential of such developments.
Hence, although the Act sanctioned the creation of trans-embryos, in a
further exercise in boundary work it simultaneously required their destruction
– in common with all other research embryos – at the 14-day stage. Doing so
limited the havoc that the trans-embryo would otherwise have wreaked by
ensuring that UK law would not be faced by Karpin’s hypothetical question
of how she/it would be legally classiﬁed should she/it be gestated and
birthed. In so doing, law tapped into an anxiety that that had not been
assuaged between 1990 and 2008, which is the horror evoked by the prospect
of birthing prohibited embryos. Sharpe is surely correct in observing that
natality plays a key role in understanding monsters. Indeed it is largely the
fact that those who receive xenografts or other animal tissues or cells have
been born human which renders them less threatening to legal categories:
Unlike the human/animal admixed embryo, the xenotransplant recipient is a
subject of the law, and any breach of the law and/or nature associated with
xenotransplantation occurs after birth when already incorporated into the
legal order.101
By contrast, the prospect that the HFEA could at some point legally license the
creation of a true hybrid by fusing gametes derived from an animal species
sufﬁciently proximate to the human to make a viable birth plausible would
pose a completely different order of challenge to the human/animal,
person/property paradigms that are foundational to law. Given this, the
legal prohibition on gestating and birthing monstrous embryos, by requiring
99See, for instance, Steven Wise’s The Nonhuman Rights Project www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/steve-
wise/ (accessed 15 February 2015).
100Braidotti (n 26) 69.
101Sharpe (n 30).
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them to be destroyed at the 14-day point, was signiﬁcant in rendering them
legally permissible. This provision serves to contain our cultural fascination
with and fear of interspecies reproduction,102 and to rule out the prospect
of trans-embryos being candidates for legal subjectivity, personhood or
human rights. Ultimately then, and notwithstanding the progressive potential
of the trans-embryo to wreak havoc on species boundaries, the legislation
which regulates it can be read as ‘a constitutional refortiﬁcation of traditional
species hierarchies’.103 The HFE Act 2008 thus functions to reinforce ‘proper’
or normative forms of corporeality and their connections to the ideal of the
legal person that have been traced in other contexts.104
Yet, I would argue that the nagging hypothetical question posed by Karpin
does suggest that meddling with received understandings of the human never-
theless requires us to rethink the underlying models of subjectivity in law. To
do so we need to formulate new ways of thinking that are not grounded in an
unreﬂective vision of human exceptionalism.105 In this regard I would argue
that it is important to embed the trans-embryo within the network of bodies
which serve to bring it into being, and speciﬁcally to connect her/it to the
animal (m)others from whom the eggs that generate trans-embryos are har-
vested.106 Focusing on the experiences which we share with non-human
animals as a result of living as embodied and gendered beings who are vulner-
able to harm and suffering and at times dependent on others offers a starting
point for new visions of subjectivity. These seem to me likely to be more pro-
ductive than querying who is the subject of human rights or who gets to count
as law’s persons, important though those questions are.107 Starting with
embodiment and embeddedness would emphasise notions of hybridity and
relationality that it seems to me are denied by the exclusionary ﬁctions of
the ‘person’ and the ‘human’. As Anne Phillips has argued: ‘Bodies alert us
to reciprocity and what we have in common, because all bodies need nourish-
ment, all bodies feel pain and all bodies are potentially vulnerable.’108
Such an approach also resonates with recent efforts to interrogate the
concept of embodiment within health law.109 Emphasising embodiment
rather than the body shifts attention from the singular body, or even multiple
102Squier (n 35) ch 23.
103Brown (n 43) 162.
104See Travis (n 9).
105Wolf (n 79) 9.
106For an account of the transfer of reproductive technologies between animal and human bodies, see
Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artiﬁcial Insemination to Artiﬁcial
Wombs (Harper Collins, 1986); Greta Gaard, ‘Feminist Animal Studies in the US: Bodies Matter’ (2012)
20 Deportate, esuli, profughe. http://www.unive.it/media/allegato/dep/n20-2012/Ricerche/Riﬂessione/
3_Gaard_Feminist_Animal_Studies.pdf.
107Harris, ‘Taking’ (n 86); Ngaire Nafﬁne, ‘Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats To Responsible Sub-
jects’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 346.
108Phillips (n 91) 37.
109See e.g. Fletcher et al (n 8).
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bodies, as the objects of analysis by mandating a broader focus on lived experi-
ence and the question of how we inhabit and experience the world through
our bodies. It also contests representations of legal subjectivity as universal
and disembodied. Applying such concepts to embryos allows us to think of
them as connected both to the human and nonhuman animals to whom
they are biologically related,110 and to the technoscientiﬁc worlds in which
they are created. As Simon Bateman Novaes and Tanya Salem have argued,
embryos always exist in a context and it is important to address how they
might be reconceptualised within the complex web of medical and familial
relationships that biotechnology had spawned.111 For humans it is easier to
reconceptualise reproductive embryos, which, like us, are already enmeshed
within familiar familial networks. Karpin has explored issues of embedded-
ness and relationality in the context of those embryos she terms ‘precon-
ceived’, demonstrating how in attributing meaning and value to
reproductive embryos law bypasses the ‘otherwise constitutive role of
women’s embodiment’.112 She argues that law ought to reﬂect instead ‘(pre)
maternal agency and women’s embodied accounts of the value of their
embryos’.113 Clearly those embryos destined for research are regarded differ-
ently from the ‘pre-conceived embryo’. Consequently, a greater imaginative
leap is required to see trans-embryos and other extra-corporeal research
embryos as kinship entities. Yet notwithstanding legal attempts to differen-
tiate and sort embryos into distinct categories114 the preconceived embryo
has much in common with the trans-embryo, notwithstanding how such con-
tinuities are downplayed by current regulatory regimes.
Thus, both types of embryos ‘exist precariously on the borderland of the
here and the not-here’115 requiring signiﬁcant boundary work to regulate
them. Both have a material presence in the world and both are the product
of embodied labour performed not only by the scientists who create
them,116 but by the reproductive labour of the animals (human and non-
human) from which/whom they are derived. The investment of human and
non-human females in reproductive labour and in their reproductive and
bodily products clearly differs. Yet, as, we have seen, both human and non-
human females exist in a transbiological context where their corporeality
and their bodily products are taken for granted as resources to be used.
110Sarah Franklin, Biological Relatives: IVF Stems Cells, and the Future of Kinship (Duke University Press,
2013).
111Simone Batemean Novaes and Tanya Salem, ‘Embedding the Embryo’ in John Harris and Soren Holm
(eds), The Future of Human Reproduction (Clarendon, 1998).
112Isabel Karpin, ‘The Legal and Relational Identity of the Not-Yet Generation’ (2012) 4 Law, Innovation and
Technology 122, 123.
113ibid.
114Fox and McGuinness (n 59).
115ibid.
116Franklin, Biological Relatives (n 110) 168.
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Recognising these shared embodied experiences and the vulnerability that
they entail might therefore offer an alternative means to think through the
question of what bodily products and forms we attribute value to and why.
In turn this serves to problematise reductionist understandings of the legal
subject, limited to the rational thinking male.
Of course, recognising the shared embodied experience of women and
animals is notwithoutpitfalls for thosewhoseek tobring animal studies and fem-
inist inquiries together. For instance, to regard embryos as embodied and rela-
tional products of reproductive labour (whether of humans or animals) raises
uncomfortable questions about how such embryos are valued, particularly as
many feminist perspectives would contest any ascription of subjectivity to
them. I would argue that they should be constituted as more than raw materials
to be exploited; but resist attempts in some recent scholarship to depict embryos
and fetuses as the most vulnerable and dependent forms of embodied life.117
Thus, in seeking to defend pro-choice politics, and laws which value women,
while simultaneously according some form of value to the embryo (or limiting
what may be done to them) we tread an admittedly ﬁne line.118
Yet, notwithstanding such perils I would argue it is important to address the
challenge posed by the creation of hybrid embryos – intended as simply a bio-
logical ‘solution’ or pragmatic regulatory response to a perceived human repro-
ductive failure and to a shortage of human eggs available for research purposes.
By exposing ruptures and gaps in our regulatory process I hope to have shown
how law requires a re-thinking of human/animal continuity and calls into ques-
tion the singularity or ‘specialness’ of the ‘human’.119 Thinking about embryos
in this way emphasises that the embodied, embedded and material nature of the
trans-embryo offers a productive starting point for thinking through our ethical
response to the trans-embryo and associated non-human ‘others’ and how we
legally regulate new and hybrid products of the technological revolution.
6. Conclusion
In this article I have argued that in recent years we have witnessed a necess-
ary insertion of questions of corporeality into health law. This has prompted
the discipline to engage with a diverse range of marginalised bodies, and
thus contribute to a feminist project of embodying and broadening
notions of legal subjectivity. While acknowledging the importance of this
117Eliza Bachiochi, ‘Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights’ (2011)
44 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 889.
118As Maneesha Dechka has argued, ‘Feminists need to provide more responses to reproductive rights and
regulation that examine the intersectional aspects of various reproductive issues’: ‘(Not) Reproducing
the Cultural, Racial and Embodied Other: A Feminist Response to Canada’s Partial Ban on Sex Selection’
(2007) 16 UCLA Women’s Law Journal 1, 2.
119Gill Haddow et al, ‘Not “Human” Enough to Be Human, but Not “Animal” Enough to Be Animal: The Case
of the HFEA, Cybrids and Xenotransplantation in the UK’ (2010) 29 New Genetics and Society 3.
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development, I have argued that an uncritical acceptance – even within fem-
inism – of the pervasiveness and naturalness of the human/animal boundary
has meant that the bodies addressed in and by law continue to be almost
exclusively human. To remedy the anthropocentrism of health law I agree
with Cary Wolf that we need to comprehend a new reality according to
which ‘the human’ occupies a new place in a universe populated by what
he calls ‘nonhuman subjects’.120 In my view, in its propensity to generate
new nonhuman others, such as the trans-embryo, technoscience has
played a key part in constituting this new reality. It is therefore imperative
for health law to redress its privileging of the human body and to consider
the need for a new form of interspecies or ahuman ethics, which would take
exploitation of animal bodies seriously.121 This new reality in which the
human is only one type of subjectivity requires us to unpack the binaries
that structure liberalism. In turn we need to rethink core concepts such as
bodily integrity, agency, knowing, and ‘the human’ itself which underpin
contemporary health law, and to consider more hybrid regulatory structures
which can encompass the non-human.122
In this article, I have suggested that as liminal and queer ﬁgures, trans-
embryos are useful subjects to consider when we think about questions of
the human, since they help to problematise or ‘queer’ the notion of the
human as special. They confront us with the issue of whether other bodies,
and how they are brought into existence, or stopped from existing at
certain points, matter. I suggest that in their potential to confuse, trouble,
or unravel concepts such as the ‘person’, the ‘embryo’ and the ‘human’, and
expose both the exclusionary and entwined histories of these concepts and
the boundary work in which law engages, trans-embryos highlight the need
for new categories or understandings of legal subjectivity. At the very least I
argue that there is a need to move beyond anthropocentrism and human
exceptionalism in law and bioethics which cast the human as special. We
also need to resist a ﬁxation on destructive boundary metaphors which
erase the signiﬁcance of embodiment in deﬁning law’s persons and limit
our ability to recognise commonalities in how animals and some humans
become reduced to the ‘merely’ corporeal.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Sarah Chan, Isabel Karpin, Sheelagh McGuinness, Michael
Thomson and the editors and reviewers of this special issue for their insightful
120Wolf (n 79) 47.
121Willetts (n 81); Patricia MacCormack, The Animal Catalyst: Towards Ahuman Theory (Bloomsbury, 2014).
122I begin to sketch how such regulatory structures might be framed in Marie Fox, ‘Legal Regulation of
New Technologies: Rethinking Xenotechnologies in the Twenty-ﬁrst Century’ in Pamela Ferguson and
Graeme Laurie (eds), Inspiring a Medico-legal Revolution: Essays in Honour of Sheila McLean (Ashgate,
2015) 201–14.
LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 229
feedback on earlier drafts of this article. The article was also shaped by feedback from
the participants at the Gender and Law at Durham (GLAD) Seminar hosted by
Durham Law School in March 2014 and at the Translational Bodies conference
held at Monash Prato Centre, Italy in April 2014.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Marie Fox is Professor of Socio-legal Studies at the School of Law, University of
Birmingham. Her research focuses on legal regulation of human and animal bodies.
230 M. FOX
Copyright of Law, Innovation & Technology is the property of © Hart Publishing, Oxford
and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without
the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or
email articles for individual use.
